

Hon. Ricardo S. Martinez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

JENNIFER P. SCHWEICKERT,

Plaintiff,

vs.

HUNTS POINT VENTURES, INC.; HUNTS
POINT VENTURE GROUP, LLC; CHAD
and ELIZABETH RUDKIN, and their marital
community comprised thereof; JOHN DU
WORS and AMBER DU WORS, and their
marital community comprised thereof; and
DOES 1-4,

Defendants.

No. 13-CV-675RSM

DEFENDANT JOHN DU WORS'
OPPOSITION TO JOYCE
SCHWEICKERT'S AND T. JEFFREY
KEANE'S MOTION TO QUASH
SUBPOENAS AND FOR SANCTIONS

NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:
September 26, 2014

I. RESPONSE

Defendants John Du Wors and Amber Du Wors ("Du Wors"), move for an order denying Joyce Schweickert's and T. Jeffrey Keane's Motion to Quash Subpoenas and for Sanctions. Du Wors filed the subpoenas to Apple and Google in good faith in order to work cooperatively with opposing counsel and third parties to get imperative documents that the plaintiff in this matter has refused to produce.

II. STATEMENT OF ISSUE

Whether the Joyce Schweickert's and T. Jeffrey Keane's Motion to Quash Subpoenas and for Sanctions should be denied?

DEFENDANT JOHN DU WORS' OPPOSITION TO
JOYCE SCHWEICKERT'S AND T. JEFFREY
KEANE'S MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENAS AND
FOR SANCTIONS - 1
13-CV-675RSM
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III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Du Wors first served “Defendant John Du Wors’ First Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff” on November 8, 2013. *See* Dkt No. 56, Ex. 1. Responses were due on December 9, 2013. Plaintiff did not provide responses until January 28, 2014. *See* Dkt No. 56, Ex. 2. Those late responses were incomplete in many ways.

- Plaintiff’s answers to Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 failed to identify material facts and were evasive; and
- Plaintiff failed to respond to Requests for Production Nos. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31.

Id.

On February 14, 2014, Plaintiff provided amended responses to the discovery requests. *See* Dkt No. 56, Ex. 4. Again, the responses were incomplete. These requests for production sought Plaintiff’s correspondence, including electronic correspondence to and/or from multiple witnesses, related to the contentions in her complaint, including Joyce Schweickert. *See* Dkt No. 56 Ex. 1. Joyce Schweickert is the mother of plaintiff, Jennifer Schweickert, and also has filed a suit in King County Superior Court against Du Wors, King County Case No. 13-2-42758-3 SEA. Plaintiff has contended that she does not have documents from other individuals involved in the many actions being pursued in connection with Hunts Point Ventures, Inc, including Joyce Schweickert. However, this is simply not credible. Plaintiff has still failed to adequately respond to Du Wors’s discovery requests.

Du Wors filed a motion to compel discovery responses, seeking electronic correspondence between Plaintiff and other relevant witnesses. *See* Dkt. No. 54, Ex. 4. The discovery has not yet been produced, as Plaintiff argued she had no such responsive documents. *See* Dkt. No. 57. The motion to compel has not yet been ruled on, and Du Wors sought to

1 obtain the relevant documents by serving email service providers, Apple and Google, with
 2 subpoenas. *Declaration of Sam B. Franklin* Ex. 1. The response date on the subpoena was
 3 inadvertently set for three days after the discovery cutoff. *See* Dkt. No. 62, Ex. 6 and 7. The
 4 subpoenas were also inadvertently sent undated. *Id.*

5 The subpoenas were purposefully broad, so that the parties could work together to
 6 narrow them on agreement. *Id.* At no time did Du Wors assume that the attorney-client
 7 privilege had been waived between Mr. Yurchak and Jennifer Schwieckert, Mr. Yurchak and
 8 Mark Phillips, or Mr. Keane and Joyce Schweickert. *Franklin Decl.* ¶2. Mr. Yurchak and Mr.
 9 Keane were included on the subpoenas in order to obtain the correspondence they each had
 10 with third parties, not their own clients. *Id.*

11 On September 4, 2014, Du Wors filed a Motion for Leave to Complete Two Specific
 12 Discovery Events beyond the Current Discovery Cutoff of September 15, 2014, in order to
 13 allow time to complete the depositions of Joyce and Steve Schweickert, and to receive
 14 responses from the Subpoenas to Apple and Google. *See* Dkt. No. 61.

15 Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Subpoenas on September 4, 2014. *See* Dkt.
 16 No. 63. Joyce Schweickert and T. Jeffrey Keane joined into plaintiff's motion on September 9,
 17 2014, and filed thier own Motion to Quash and for Sanctions that same day. *See* Dkt. No. 66
 18 and 67.

19 IV. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON

20 The pleadings, as well as the Declaration of Sam B. Franklin with attached exhibits.

21 V. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

22 A. Standard on motion to quash.

23 A party is entitled to discovery into matters "reasonably calculated to lead to the
 24 discovery of admissible evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The party who resists discovery
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1 has the burden to show discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of explaining, and
 2 supporting its objections. *Blankenship v. Hearst Corp.*, 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir.1975). A
 3 party's right to obtain material pursuant to a Rule 45 subpoena to a third party is as broad as
 4 otherwise permitted under the discovery rules. *See, e.g.,* Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal
 5 Practice & Procedure § 2459 at pp. 44–45 (2d. ed.1994).

6 Here, Joyce Schweickert and T. Jeffrey Keane have objected to the timeliness of the
 7 subpoenas. As discussed above, the response date on the subpoena was inadvertently set for
 8 three days after the discovery cutoff and the subpoena was inadvertently sent undated. Du
 9 Wors has since filed a Motion for Leave to Complete Two Specific Discovery Events beyond
 10 the Current Discovery Cutoff of September 15, 2014 in order to accommodate the subpoenas
 11 and obtain pertinent discovery with no prejudice to the plaintiff.

12 As to the scope of the subpoenas, the subpoenas were purposefully broad, so that the
 13 parties (including third parties) could work together to narrow that scope on agreement. Du
 14 Wors is not arguing that attorney-client privilege has been waived, and is not seeking email
 15 correspondence between Mr. Yurchak and Jennifer Schwieckert, Mr. Yurchak and Mark
 16 Phillips, or Mr. Keane and Joyce Schweickert. The electronic correspondence sought is that
 17 between the parties listed, save communication between Mr. Yurchak and Mr. Keane and their
 18 own clients.

19 Email correspondence between the individuals listed on the subpoenas are absolutely
 20 relevant to this matter and within the scope of discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
 21 Further, Du Wors is willing to work with Joyce Schweickert's counsel, T. Jeffrey Keane, in
 22 order to reach an agreement as to narrowing the scope of the subpoena as to avoid "any
 23 intensely private and personal emails between a mother and daughter" that are not related to
 24 this matter.

B. The Subpoenas are not in violation of the Stored Communications Act.

Joyce Schweickert and T. Jeffrey Keane argue that, “SDTs have been prepared and served in violation of the Secured Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 to 2707, and are therefore subject to being quashed by the court. *See* Dkt. No. 67.

Federal courts interpreting the SCA have noted that its general purpose “was to create a cause of action against computer hackers.” *Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda*, 390 F.Supp.2d 479, 495-96 (D. Md. 2005) (citing cases). *See also United States v. Smith*, 155 F.3d 1051, 1058–59 (9th Cir.1998) (explaining that the SCA permits penalties against hackers who put themselves in the position to acquire a communication); *Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp.*, C11-1438-JCC, 2014 WL 1232593 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2014) (“Federal courts interpreting [the SCA and the CFAA] have noted that their ‘general purpose ... was to create a cause of action against computer hackers’”). Based on Fourth Amendment concerns, the SCA also permits the government to obtain the documents regarding a criminal defendant, but only where certain protections are met. *See e.g.*, § 2701(a). Otherwise, while the legal authority in this area is still somewhat muddled, this Court is likely well-aware that subpoenas to service providers such as Apple and Google are routine in litigation when the information is being sought from parties to the litigation, which is a different thing altogether.

The SCA still permits disclosure by consent of the individual party. *See e.g.*, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)-(3); *Theofel v. Farey-Jones*, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004). Where a party has initiated litigation, they should be compelled to consent to reasonable discovery. In *Flagg v. City of Detroit*, 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008),¹ a party contended that neither the opposing party (through a subpoena) nor the court (through an order) could compel the

¹ Within the *Flagg* opinion, there is some interesting discussion of Ninth Circuit case, some unfavorable; although the unfavorable Ninth Circuit case was subsequently reversed by the United States Supreme Court. *See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc.*, 529 F.3d 892, 903 (9th Cir. 2008), *rev’d and remanded sub nom. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon*, 560 U.S. 746, 130 S.Ct. 2619 (2010).

1 information carrier “to produce the contents of any communications it might still retain under
 2 its contract to provide text messaging services to the City of Detroit.” *Id.* at 350. The court
 3 equated the situation presented to that where the materials sought to be discovered were in the
 4 actual possession of the party, holding:

5 Although Plaintiff chose third-party subpoenas as the vehicle for seeking the
 6 production of SkyTel text messages, the Court finds it instructive to consider
 7 whether Plaintiff could have achieved the same objective through an ordinary
 8 Fed.R.Civ.P. 34 request for production directed at the Defendant City. As
 9 discussed below, the Court answers this question in the affirmative.

10 *Id.* at 352.

11 [A] party has an obligation under [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] Rule 34 to
 12 produce materials within its control, and this obligation carries with it the
 13 attendant duty to take the steps necessary to exercise this control and retrieve the
 14 requested documents.... [A] party’s disinclination to exercise this control is
 15 immaterial, just as it is immaterial whether a party might prefer not to produce
 16 documents in its possession or custody.

17 *Flagg*, 252 F.R.D. at 363.

18 The court continued:

19 It is a necessary and routine incident of the rules of discovery that a court may
 20 order disclosures that a party would prefer not to make.... [T]his power of
 21 compulsion encompasses such measures as are necessary to secure a party’s
 22 compliance with its discovery obligations. In this case, the particular device that
 23 the SCA calls for is ‘consent,’ and [the defendant] has not cited any authority for
 24 the proposition that a court lacks the power to ensure that this necessary
 25 authorization is forthcoming from a party with the means to provide it. Were it
 otherwise, a party could readily avoid its discovery obligations by warehousing
 its documents with a third party under strict instructions to release them only
 with the party’s “consent.”

Id.

Ultimately, the *Flagg* court instructed the party issuing the subpoena to reissue the
 subpoenas as a request for production to which the responding party had to provide responsive
 documents. *Id.* at 366. This is the very relief sought in Defendants’ motion to compel, *See*
 Dkt. No. 54.

1 Du Wors is aware that Joyce Schweickert is not a party to this particular action,
 2 however, Du Wors believes that this Court has the authority to compel Plaintiff, Jennifer
 3 Schweickert, to "consent" to disclosure of documents in the subpoenas (including those emails
 4 between herself and Joyce Schweickert), just like it has the power to compel a party to
 5 "consent" to turn over documents in response to a request for production. Plaintiff has averred
 6 she no longer has possession and control of her responsive emails and refuses to produce them.
 7 See Dkt. No. 57, 3-3. Du Wors would not have sought production from third parties, including
 8 Joyce Schweickert, if Plaintiff had produced emails properly and timely requested under Rule
 9 34. Du Wors recognizes that the subpoenas may be too broad, and would willingly narrowly
 10 tailor the scope of documents sought for purposes of this litigation. However, Plaintiff should
 11 not be able to avoid discovery by claiming that no emails exist, then withholding her "consent"
 12 to obtain any potentially responsive documents that the internet provider may possess and
 13 which are within her control, simply because she has warehoused them with a nonparty
 14 provider. As such, the Court should permit Du Wors to provide Apple and Google with a more
 15 narrowly-tailored set of guidelines as to the documents sought, and order Plaintiff to consent to
 16 the subpoena, including relevant emails between herself and Joyce Schweickert, so that
 17 discovery can be appropriately concluded.

18 **C. Sanctions against Du Wors are not warranted.**

19 Du Wors's subpoenas for electronic correspondence were made in good faith and are
 20 sought to defend his case. Joyce Schweickert and T. Jeffrey Keane have not provided any facts
 21 that warrant any sanctions. The court may reject an award of terms or sanctions if it would be
 22 unjust. See generally CR 37(a). Therefore, this court should deny Joyce Schweickert and T.
 23 Jeffrey Keane's motion for terms.
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VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Joyce Schweickert's and T. Jeffrey Keane's Motion to Quash Subpoenas and for Sanctions should be denied.

Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of September, 2014.

LEE SMART, P.S., INC.

By: /s/ Sam B. Franklin
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the date provided at the signature below, I electronically filed the preceding document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following individuals:

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
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I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

EXECUTED this 22nd day of September, 2014, at Seattle, Washington.


Marie Vestal Sharpe, Legal Assistant